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Abstract	and	Keywords
People	often	say	that	some	normative	ethical	theory,	act	consequentialism	perhaps,	faces
some	objection	based	on	‘obvious	intuitions’.	It	is	also	sometimes	said—e.g.	by	Bernard
Williams—that	a	theory	like	act	consequentialism	can	make	some	things	too	obvious;	can
make	obvious	things	that	aren’t	obvious	but	deeply	morally	problematic	and	troubling
even	if	correct.	Ridge	and	McKeever	agree	that	objections	of	Williams’	sort	can
sometimes	have	some	weight;	but	how	much	weight,	and	how	often?	They	remind	us	that
the	anti-theorist’s	deeper	aim	is	often	to	insist	on	the	subtlety	and	variety	of	the	moral
landscape.	But,	the	more	subtle	and	variable	the	moral	landscape	can	be,	the	less	sure
we	can	be	that	we	know	which	cases	truly	are	the	‘hard	ones’.	And	if	we	cannot	be
confident	which	cases	are	hard,	then	we	cannot	have	strong	reason	to	reject	a	theory	for
miscategorizing	hard	cases.
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I
Perplexity,	it	might	be	thought,	is	the	philosopher’s	mortal	enemy,	always	to	be
vanquished,	never	accommodated.	For	normative	theorists,	the	typical	weapon	of	choice
is	an	explanatory	theory	couched	in	general	or	principled	terms,	one	that	lays	out	the
various	considerations	that	can	make	acts	right	and	wrong	and	how	these	considerations
balance	against	one	another.	Though	open	to	important	variations,	there	is	a	familiar
choreography	to	the	ensuing	battles.	We	begin	with	an	array	of	relatively	specific	claims	in
which	we	place	great	confidence;	call	these	intuitions.	The	theory,	it	is	hoped,	will	more	or
less	preserve	these	intuitions,	forcing	minor	revisions	here,	shedding	a	bit	of	light	there,
but	mostly	leaving	things	as	they	stood.	After	all,	forcing	revision	to	firmly	held	beliefs
introduces	perplexity	of	its	own.	How	could	we	have	ever	been	so	sure	of	what	we	now
reject?!	Some	significant	revision	is	no	doubt	inevitable,	but	it	is	regrettable	all	the	same,
and	if	it	gives	rise	to	additional	perplexity,	then	this	is	just	another	philosophical	skirmish
to	be	fought.
But,	of	course,	our	intuitions	cover	only	small	and	irregular	patches	of	the	moral	terrain.
Intuitions	are	not	(at	least	as	we	use	the	term	here)	to	be	identified	with	whatever	a
subject	might	be	brought	to	say	about	a	case	if	pressed.	Whether	they	are	pre-reflective
is	not	essential,	but	a	depth	of	confidence	is.	Intuitions	are	claims	we	place	confidence	in
and	in	which	we	think	ourselves	right	to	have	confidence	(even	if	we	cannot	say	why).
Thus	understood,	it	should	be	clear	that	intuitions	are	the	exception,	not	the	rule	of
moral	life.	For	there	are	innumerable	issues	on	which	we	are	uncertain,	confused,
conflicted,	ambivalent,	or	schizophrenic.	And	then	there	are	the	questions	which	have
engaged	us	so	little	that	we	hardly	have	thoughts	about	them	at	all.	Much	of	this
perplexity	is	surely	due	to	uncertainty	about	underlying	non-moral	facts—facts	that	may
be	morally	relevant	but	that	can	be	characterized	in	a	non-moral	way.	But	we	will	assume
here	that	this	(p.41)	 is	not	always	the	case.	Much	of	our	perplexity	is	at	bottom	moral;	it
is	perplexity	about	what	sorts	of	considerations	are	morally	relevant	and	how	they
balance	against	one	another.	Normative	theories,	it	is	commonly	thought,	should	yield
answers	about	these	perplexing	matters.	The	point	of	normative	theorizing	is	not	merely
to	build	a	foundation	that	will	secure	our	pre-existing	views,	but	to	bring	light	to
previously	dark	corners.
One	might	worry	whether	the	project	just	sketched	can	succeed	at	all,	but	here	we	ask	a
different	question:	can	it	succeed	too	well?	The	basic	idea	is	this.	Sometimes	perplexity	is
in	order;	a	moral	question	is	such	that	we	should	be	uncertain	or	conflicted	about	its
answer.	If	this	is	right,	then	perhaps	theories	that	yield	clear	and	straightforward
answers	to	‘hard’	cases	are,	on	that	ground	alone,	flawed.	If	the	theory	renders	obvious
what	should	not	be	obvious,	can	this	be	a	mark	against	the	theory?
Bernard	Williams	lodged	a	particularly	well-known	version	of	this	complaint	in	his
argument	against	utilitarianism.	After	introducing	his	now	famous	examples—the	first
involving	a	chemist	(George)	who	is	offered	a	job	working	on	the	production	of	chemical
weapons	(something	he	abhors),	and	the	second	involving	a	traveller	(Jim)	who	is	enticed
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by	a	warlord	to	save	nineteen	captured	Indians	but	only	by	shooting	one	himself—
Williams	remarks:
To	these	dilemmas,	it	seems	to	me	that	utilitarianism	replies,	in	the	first	case	that
George	should	accept	the	job,	and	in	the	second,	that	Jim	should	kill	the	Indian.	Not
only	does	utilitarianism	give	these	answers	but,	if	the	situations	are	essentially	as
described	and	there	are	no	other	special	factors,	it	regards	them,	it	seems	to	me,
as	obviously	the	right	answers.	But	many	of	us	would	certainly	wonder	whether	in
(1),	that	could	possibly	be	the	right	answer	at	all;	and	in	the	case	of	(2),	even	one
who	came	to	think	that	perhaps	that	was	the	answer,	might	well	wonder	whether	it
was	obviously	the	answer.(Williams,	1973:	99,	emphasis	in	original)
As	Williams	goes	on	to	make	clear,	these	examples	are	not	intended	as	standard
counterexamples.	Williams	is	willing	to	grant	that	George	should	take	the	job	and	Jim
should	shoot	an	Indian.	The	complaint	is	that	utilitarianism	is	making	obvious	something
that	isn’t	or	shouldn’t	be.	Famously,	Williams	goes	on	to	proffer	an	explanation	for	why
utilitarianism	renders	obvious	what	should	not	be.	Utilitarianism	cannot,	Williams	claims,
make	sense	of	the	value	of	integrity	which	is	crucially	at	play	in	the	examples.	This	further
explanation	(left	unexamined	here)	is	meant	to	bolster	the	case	against	utilitarianism.	But
the	argument	at	issue	here	is	not	initiated	by	this	further	explanation.	If	anything,	matters
are	reversed.	It	is	only	because	we	think	it	a	flaw	that	the	theory	makes	obvious	what
shouldn’t	be	that	we	look	for	a	deeper	explanation	of	how	and	why	the	theory	is
oversimplifying	matters.
(p.42)	 Lest	Williams’s	use	of	this	form	of	argument	seem	idiosyncratic,	here	is	another
example,	this	one	taken	from	D.	D.	Raphael’s	‘The	Standard	of	Morals’	(1975):
Sartre	gives	us	a	good	instance	of	moral	conflict	in	his	young	friend	during	the
Second	World	War	who	had	to	choose	whether	to	go	off	and	join	the	Resistance	or
to	stay	with	his	widowed	mother.	The	advantage	of	this	well-known	example	is	that	it
is	taken	from	real	life	and	might	have	faced	any	of	us.	If	you	were	to	think	of	the
young	man’s	dilemma	simply	in	terms	of	treating	persons	as	ends	and	of	the
number	of	persons	affected,	his	proper	choice	would	be	obvious;	but	in	fact,	of
course,	the	right	choice	is	not	in	the	least	obvious.(Raphael,	1974–5:	9–10)
Although	the	argument	here	is	enthymematic,	it	is	clear	that	the	target	is	Kantian	moral
theory.	So	whereas	Williams	used	this	form	of	argument	to	criticize	utilitarianism,	Raphael
uses	it	instead	to	criticize	utilitarianism’s	main	rival,	Kantianism.
Our	interest,	we	should	stress,	is	not	utilitarianism	in	particular,	or	even	an	evaluation	of
Williams’s	own	argument,	which	has	already	received	ample	discussion.	Instead,	our
interest	is	in	the	form	of	arguments	along	these	lines,	and	whether	they	ever	can	be
sound.	Our	qualified	and	cautious	answer	is	yes,	though	such	arguments	are	liable	to	be
very	weak.	Perhaps	surprisingly,	one	ground	for	such	weakness	derives	precisely	from	a
feature	of	morality	that	is	often	emphasized	by	those	who	are	sceptical	of	general
normative	theory.	But	we	will	come	to	that	conclusion	in	a	roundabout	way	by	first
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considering	a	variety	of	ways	that	such	arguments	can	go	awry.
II
In	an	oft-repeated	quip	some	philosopher	insists	that	a	point	is	obvious,	whereupon
another	retorts,	‘Yes,	that’s	right,	but	the	trouble	is	that	you	think	your	point	is
obviously	true	while	others	of	us	think	it	obviously	false.’	Fair	enough	(sometimes);
philosophers	can	be	tendentious.	But	an	on-target	quip	does	not	a	general	theorem	make.
From	the	fact	that	appeals	to	obviousness	are	often	lame	attempts	to	scuttle
disagreement,	it	does	not	follow	that	we	are	never	in	substantial	agreement	that	some
point	is	true	and	obviously	so.	Were	that	so,	it	would	present	at	least	a	dialectical	barrier
to	arguments	of	the	sort	we	are	considering.	But	on	reflection,	we	do	often	find
ourselves	in	substantial	agreement	that	some	claim	is	true	and	obvious.
We	offer	no	definition	of	substantial	agreement,	but	it	is	a	looser	standard	than
consensus.	It	may	be	true	that	there	is	no	claim	which	we	unanimously	agree	is	both	true
and	obvious,	but	it	would	be	churlish	to	insist	on	unanimity.	In	the	present	discussion,	we
set	to	the	side	the	serious	challenges	to	moral	‘intuitions’	(p.43)	 and	the	prominent	role
they	play	in	constructing	and	assessing	normative	theories.	Arguments	such	as	Williams’s
are	not	supposed	to	depend	upon	general	scepticism	about	moral	intuitions.	At	issue
instead	is	whether,	given	that	one	measures	a	theory	in	part	by	its	ability	to	fit	and	explain
our	intuitions,	a	theory	can	go	wrong	by,	somehow,	conflicting	with	our	intuitions	about
what	is	obvious.	Against	that	backdrop,	it	cannot	be	assumed	that	all	appeals	to	what	is
obvious	are	tendentious	because	there	is	no	agreement	about	what	is	obvious.	By	the
same	token,	there	is	virtually	never	consensus	about	moral	intuitions,	but	there	may	be
widespread	agreement.	And	just	so,	there	may	be	(sometimes)	widespread	agreement
about	what	is	obvious.	The	appeal	to	intuitions	about	the	obvious	may	yet	prove
tendentious.	Our	present	point	is	only	that	this	conclusion	cannot	be	established	by	quip
or	by	the	casual	and	false	assumption	that	there	is	insufficient	interpersonal	agreement
about	what	is	obvious.
Turning	to	more	worrying	problems,	let	p	stand	for	a	particular	moral	claim	and	T	for	a
normative	theory.	Here	is	one	form	that	arguments	such	as	this	might	take:
(i)	p	is	not	obvious	(even	if	true).
(ii)	If	T	were	true,	p	would	be	obvious.
So,
(iii)	T	is	false.
As	others	have	already	rightly	argued,	this	argument	form	is	not	promising.	In	a	given
case,	premise	(ii)	is	almost	surely	false,	and	any	illusion	of	its	truth	is	likely	to	be	the
product	of	confusion.	The	truth	of	a	theory	just	does	not	typically	confer	obviousness	on
its	implications.	One	reason	for	this,	noted	by	Fred	Feldman	in	a	discussion	of	Williams,	is
that	a	true	theory	can	itself	be	quite	unobvious,	even	when	it	is	known	to	be	true.	The
truth	of	utilitarianism	can	hardly	establish	that	Jim	killing	an	Indian	is,	morally	speaking,	a
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‘no-brainer.’	This	is	due	in	part	to	what	we	all	know:	utilitarianism	itself	is	not	a	no-brainer
(Feldman,	1986;	see	also	Lenman,	2004).
If	(ii)	seems	plausible,	this	may	be	on	account	of	confusing	it	with	what	is	more	plausibly
true.	It	is	obvious,	it	may	seem,	that	T	implies	p.	In	the	moral	case,	however,	T	will	imply
p	only	relative	to	certain	contingent	facts.	Call	these	F.	For	example,	it	is	commonly
assumed	that	utilitarianism	implies	that	Jim	should	shoot	an	Indian	relative	to	the
assumptions	that	(i)	Pedro	will	honour	his	pledge	to	release	the	other	hostages	if	Jim
shoots	and	that	(ii)	he	will	kill	all	the	hostages	if	Jim	refuses.	Some	are	suspicious	of	the
implication	even	then	(Lenman,	2004).	Even	setting	that	worry	to	the	side,	however,	if
one	replaces	F	with	other	facts	one	(p.44)	 may	lose	the	implication.	Since	the	facts	on
which	the	implication	depends	may	not	be	obvious,	the	implication	may	not	be	obvious
either.	Finally,	even	if	the	further-needed	facts	are	true	and	obvious,	the	implication	itself
may	not	be	obvious.	What	follows	from	Kant’s	Formula	of	Universal	Law,	for	example,	is
hardly	obvious	even	when	knowledge	of	the	underlying	facts	is	safe	and	secure.
What	is	plausibly	true,	then,	is	only	this:
(iv)	(T	implies	p)	given	F.
Can	the	argument	be	rehabilitated	on	this	basis?	Let	us	just	suppose	that	it	is	obvious
that	(T	implies	p)	given	F.	It	might	then	be	thought	that:
(v)	If	T	were	obvious	and	F	were	obvious,	then	p	would	be	obvious.
Arguments	relying	on	(v)	would	have	limited	application,	of	course,	since	theories	and
facts	may	seldom	cooperate	by	being	obvious.	One	might	try	to	turn	this	into	an
argument	with	the	following	form:
(1)	p	is	not	obvious	(even	if	true).
(2)	If	T	is	obvious	and	F	is	obvious,	then	p	is	obvious	[on	the	grounds	that	(T
implies	p)	given	F].
(3)	If	T	is	true,	then	T	is	obvious.
(4)	F	is	obvious.
(5)	If	T	were	true,	then	p	would	be	obvious.
(6)	So,	T	is	not	true.
Even	when	the	obviousness	of	initial	facts	and	theory	are	in	place,	we	really	have	here
only	the	ingredients	of	a	paradox.	Premises	(1)	to	(4)	are	an	inconsistent	quartet,	but	it	is
an	open	question	which	of	them	we	should	reject.
If	one	initially	accepted	all	four	claims,	then	rationality	would	require	one	to	reject	one	of
them.	We	suspect,	however,	that	in	most	cases	the	natural	adjustment	would	be	to	reject
(3)	or	(4).	Philosophical	theories	of	interest	are	seldom	such	that	if	they	are	true	then
they	are	obviously	true,	and	contingent	facts	which	are	relevant	in	these	contexts	will	also
often	not	be	obvious.	So	these	are	in	a	sense	the	smallest	steps	needed	to	restore
coherence	to	our	judgements.	One	could	reject	(1),	but	this	would	require	both
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changing	one’s	view	of	p’s	obviousness	and	taking	a	stand	on	p’s	truth.	By	contrast,	we
can	restore	coherence	simply	by	adjusting	our	view	of	T’s	(or	F’s)	obviousness	(see	also
Lenman,	2004).
Some	critics	of	Williams’s	argument	are	willing	to	accept	(2)	(Feldman,	1986).	On	close
inspection,	however,	the	support	one	might	give	for	(2)	is	actually	very	weak,	so	we	could
also	reasonably	abandon	(2).	Obviousness	does	not	seem	to	transmit	from	theory	to
implications	under	even	these	highly	restricted	(p.45)	 conditions.	Sometimes	a	theory	is
obvious	as	is	the	fact	that	the	theory	carries	some	implication.	And	yet	the	implication	may
remain	stubbornly	surprising	and	unobvious.	For	example,	I	find	the	basic	rules	of
arithmetical	calculation	obvious.	Moreover,	it	is	obvious	that	if	these	rules	are	correct,
then	29	=	512.	But	it	remains	surprising	that	29	=	512.	The	rapidity	with	which	the
numbers	increase	when	raised	to	a	higher	power	can	stubbornly	confound	our
expectations.	To	take	another	example,	one	can,	with	training,	find	the	rules	for	calculating
compound	interest	quite	obvious.	And	yet	the	gross	amount	required	to	pay	off	a	long-
term	loan	may	continue	to	have	the	power	to	startle.
We	have	so	far	left	unexamined	just	what	it	is	for	some	claim	to	be	obvious.	Implicit	in	the
discussion,	however,	has	been	the	idea	that	the	obvious	is	to	be	contrasted	with	what	is
hard	to	see	or	surprising.	Thus	understood	it	is	perhaps	predictable	that	we	have	no	firm
rules	for	when	the	implications	of	some	theory	will	be	obvious	or	not.	Whether	some
claim	is	obvious	says	more	about	us	than	it	need	say	about	what	might	explain	or	justify
that	claim.	Even	if	we	start	out	in	substantial	agreement	about	what	is	obvious,	we	cannot
project	that	agreement	into	the	future	with	any	confidence.
This	brings	us	to	a	final	and	related	trouble	with	the	present	way	of	construing	the
argument	form	we	are	considering.	Something	that	is	obvious	at	one	time	need	not	be
obvious	at	another	time.	Theories	do,	on	occasion,	have	the	effect	of	making	obvious	for
us	what	was	previously	uncertain.	We	can	grant	that	it	is	not	obvious	that	Jim’s	moral
duty	is	to	shoot	an	Indian.	And	even	if	utilitarianism	is	true	and	implies	that	Jim	should
shoot	an	Indian,	the	unobviousness	of	utilitarianism	is	liable	to	leave	the	unobviousness	of
Jim’s	duty	undisturbed.	But	suppose	that	we	became	utterly	convinced	that	utilitarianism
is	true,	and	suppose	this	had	the	effect	of	making	it	obvious	to	us	that	Jim’s	duty	is	to
shoot	an	Indian.	What	would	be	objectionable	about	this	turn	of	events?	We	are	looking
for	an	argument	that	does	not	depend	on	ordinary	counterexample,	so	we	cannot
assume	that	it	is	not	Jim’s	duty	to	shoot	an	Indian.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	Jim’s	moral
duty	to	shoot	an	Indian,	then	there	seems	nothing	wrong	with	utilitarianism	if	this
becomes	obvious.
This	last	point	must	not	be	confused	with	the	intriguing	possibility	that	there	would	be
something	wrong	with	a	person	who	found	it	obvious	that	someone	like	Jim	should	shoot
an	Indian.	In	the	same	way	that	surprising	mathematical	results	can	lead	us	to	‘check	our
work’,	a	surprising	moral	conclusion	might	lead	us	to	‘check	our	deliberation’.	Moreover,
there	may	be	good	utilitarian	reasons	for	being	disposed	to	‘check	one’s	work’	before
quickly	dispatching	an	innocent	Indian.	So	perhaps	a	good	person	would	never	find	the
rightness	of	shooting	an	Indian	obvious.	But	again,	this	says	more	about	us	than	it	does
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about	the	truth	of	utilitarianism.
(p.46)	 The	lesson	of	the	foregoing	discussion	is	this.	If	obviousness	is	subjective—
simply	a	matter	of	how	surprising	or	clear	cut	things	seem	to	us—then	we	cannot	cast
doubt	on	a	theory	by	claiming	that	it	would	make	some	non-obvious	claim	obvious.	First,
it	is	not	generally	true	that	theories	have	the	power	to	make	their	implications	obvious.
Secondly,	even	if	a	theory	did	have	this	effect,	it	would	say	more	about	us	than	about	the
theory.
III
To	rehabilitate	the	argument	under	consideration,	we	need	to	look	in	another	direction
and	use	a	more	objective	conception	of	what	is	obvious.	In	this	section,	we	explore	a
conception	of	the	obvious/unobvious	contrast	according	to	which	it	is	cashed	out	in	terms
of	simplicity	of	explanation.	When	we	say	that	it	is	not	obvious	that	Jim	should	shoot	an
Indian,	we	may	be	thinking	that	this	is	a	‘hard	case’,	a	case	that	it	does	not	admit	of	a
simple	explanation.	By	contrast,	when	we	speak	of	what	is	obviously	morally	so,	we	may
be	thinking	of	things	whose	moral	explanation	is	simple.
We	here	set	aside	the	difficult	task	of	characterizing	simplicity	of	explanation.	We	do
assume	that	simplicity	of	explanation	is	sufficiently	objective	even	if	it	is	not	utterly
independent	of	our	particular	human	capacities	and	cognitive	interests.	We	assume	only
that	if	norms	of	simplicity	are	relevant	to	theory	assessment	then	these	norms	will	be
sufficiently	stable	across	persons	and	times.	When	a	theory	explains	some	phenomenon
we	can	assess	that	explanation	for	its	simplicity/complexity	by	applying	shared	and	stable
standards.	That	should	be	enough	for	us	at	least	to	avoid	the	pitfalls	explored	in	previous
sections.
We	can	now	consider	a	new	version	of	our	target	argument:
(i)	p	(though	it	may	be	true)	does	not	admit	of	a	simple	explanation.
(ii)	If	T	were	true,	then	there	would	be	a	simple	explanation	for	p.
So,
(iii)	T	is	false.
The	difficulty	with	this	form	of	argument	lies	in	the	first	premise.	How	can	we	know	that	(i)
is	true?
We	might,	of	course,	believe	that	p	requires	a	non-simple	explanation	because	we	have
worked	out	a	specific	and	complex	explanation.	But	how	do	we	know	that	this	is	the
correct	explanation	and	that	no	simpler	explanation	will	do?	The	natural	suggestion	is	that
our	complex	explanation	for	p	is	embedded	in	a	broader	theory	which	is	itself	well
justified.	This	theory	must	be	a	rival	to	T.	This	is	(p.47)	 clearly	question-begging,
however.	If	the	claim	that	p	cannot	be	simply	explained	depends	on	a	prior	rejection	of	T,
then	that	claim	cannot	be	deployed	in	a	persuasive	argument	against	T.
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One	might	try	to	press	this	point	further	by	claiming	that	we	have	no	reliable	intuitions
about	how	complex	explanations	must	be	except	those	that	are	driven	by	broader
judgements	about	the	theories	relative	to	which	explanations	are	given.	But	this	seems	to
go	too	far.	Sometimes	we	can	have	confidence	in	a	particular	explanation	even	without
having	fitted	that	explanation	into	a	broader	framework	that	one	would	call	a	theory.	For
example,	if	one	is	in	a	position	to	save	either	a	group	of	ten	or	a	(non-overlapping)	group
of	two	strangers,	most	agree	that	one	should	save	ten,	ceteris	paribus.	Furthermore,
many	would	agree	that	the	explanation	for	this	duty	is	that	ten	lives	is	more	than	two.	One
can	find	compelling	this	simple	explanation	without	first	being	wedded	to	a	broader
theory,	such	as	utilitarianism,	into	which	this	explanation	might	be	fitted.	Even	those	with
non-consequentialist	predilections	might	hope	that	they	can	accommodate	the	idea	that
what	explains	the	duty	to	save	ten	is	a	simple	fact	about	greater	numbers.
We	are	here	relying	on	a	distinction	between	the	particular	facts	that	explain	a	particular
moral	truth	and	the	broader	theory	which	sets	out	a	story	about	how	those	facts
succeed	in	being	explanatory	across	a	thorough	range	of	cases.	This	is	a	distinction	that
has	been	much	emphasized	by	particularists	such	as	Jonathan	Dancy	(2004)	who	are
keen	to	allow	that	one	can	frame	sound	moral	explanations	without	implicating	universal
principles.	But	it	is	a	distinction	that	can,	and	should,	be	accepted	even	by	those	not
attracted	to	particularism.	If	one	denies	the	distinction	one	is	left	saying	that	the	‘complete
explanation’	of	any	particular	moral	truth	involves	a	full	moral	theory.	One	cost	to	this
move,	however,	is	that	it	undermines	the	contrast	between	simple	and	complex
explanations	of	moral	phenomena.
For	example,	assume	for	the	moment	that	some	version	of	utilitarianism	is	true.	Assume
further	that	one	should	save	ten	rather	than	two,	ceteris	paribus.	Finally,	assume	that
governments	ought	to	raise	revenue	via	graduated	income	taxes	rather	than
consumption	taxes.	This	should	leave	us	able,	we	think,	to	say	that	some	moral	truths
admit	of	simple	explanations	(such	as	saving	ten	rather	than	two),	while	others	would
require	complicated	explanations	(such	as	the	best	legal	regime	for	raising	revenue).
However,	if	utilitarianism	must	itself	be	part	of	the	‘complete	explanation’	of	any	true
moral	claim,	then	the	complete	explanation	for	each	of	these	moral	claims	must	be	highly
complex.	It	needn’t	follow	that	the	two	explanations	are	equally	complex,	since	there
remain	other	differences	between	the	cases.	Nonetheless,	it	seems	safe	to	say	there
would	be	no	simple	moral	explanations,	at	least	not	by	our	ordinary	baseline	of	simplicity
in	such	matters.
(p.48)	 Indeed,	we	typically	understand	such	simpler	explanations	to	provide	common
ground	between	partisans	of	different	moral	theories	(and	opponents	of	moral	theory,	for
that	matter).	It	is	because	the	consequentialist	and	the	deontologist	agree	that	(e.g.)	the
fact	that	one	could	save	more	strangers	by	performing	a	given	action	provides	a	kind	of
explanation	of	why	one	ought	to	perform	the	action	that	they	can	then	have	a	meaningful
debate	about	which	theory	best	explains	why	that	fact	explains	the	rightness	of	the	action.
As	Jonathan	Dancy	has	argued,	we	must	be	cautious	about	assuming	that	simply	because
one	fact	(the	truth	of	a	given	moral	theory,	say)	enables	some	other	fact	(the	fact	about
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saving	a	greater	number	of	strangers,	say)	to	explain	some	phenomena	that	the	enabling
fact	is	(or	must	be)	itself	part	of	any	adequate	explanation	of	the	phenomena	explained.
So	we	accept	that	we	can	frame	sound	moral	explanations	without	prior	recourse	to
theory.	And	as	the	case	of	saving	the	ten	suggests,	sometimes	we	can	be	sufficiently
confident	in	the	simplicity	of	an	explanation	that	this	should	influence	our	choice	of
theories.	If	non-consequentialists	cannot	show	that	facts	about	the	greater	number	can
(in	suitable	cases)	explain	what	is	right,	then	so	much	the	worse	for	non-consequentialism.
The	challenge	for	non-consequentialists	is	to	make	sense	of	this	simple	explanation	without
compromising	their	other	theoretical	commitments.
But	granting	all	of	this	is	not	enough	to	vindicate	the	argument	form	we	are	considering.
For	that	argument	relies	on	the	assumption	that	some	moral	claim	(if	true)	requires	a
non-simple	explanation.	By	contrast,	we	have	so	far	only	granted	that	sometimes	we	are
rightly	confident	that	some	claim	admits	of	a	simple	explanation.	Put	another	way,	we	may
sometimes	have	good	reason	to	reject	a	theory	because	it	needlessly	complicates
matters.	But	it	is	a	far	stretch	from	here	to	the	claim	that	we	can	reject	a	theory	for
unduly	simplifying	matters.
Once	we	focus	on	this	dimension	of	the	argument,	moreover,	it	is	doubtful	we	are
entitled	to	such	a	premise.	First,	there	is	an	inductive	point.	Intellectual	progress	is
regularly	marked	by	the	discovery	of	surprisingly	simple	explanations.	For	example,
Darwin’s	theory	of	natural	selection	has	struck	many	as	elegantly	simple,	even	though	it
took	centuries	for	anyone	even	to	frame	the	theory,	much	less	to	accept	it	as	an	obvious
truth.	Given	this	history,	we	must	be	modest	about	the	credence	we	place	in	our	beliefs
about	how	complex	an	explanation	of	some	phenomenon	must	be.
A	second	worry	concerns	how	simplicity	itself	functions	as	a	guide	to	theory	choice.
Simpler	explanations,	it	is	typically	thought,	are	to	be	preferred	other	things	being	equal.
However,	other	things	are	not	always	equal.	It	should	go	without	saying	that	if	a	simpler
explanation	is	flawed	on	some	other	grounds,	this	may	be	enough	for	us	to	reject	it.	But
the	argument	presently	under	(p.49)	 consideration	does	not	contemplate	(yet)	such
further	flaws.	It	instead	asks	us	to	think	along	the	following	lines:	This	explanation	is
perfectly	fine	so	far	as	it	goes,	but	I	should	reject	a	theory	that	yields	this	explanation	just
because	the	explanation	is	too	simple.	This	does	seem	perverse.	Without	a	more	specific
account	of	the	shortcomings	of	a	given	explanation,	what	justifies	me	in	thinking	it	is	too
simple?
Note	that	Williams’s	broader	argument	(if	interpreted	along	these	lines)	is	arguably
immune	to	this	criticism.	This	is	because	Williams	does	not	stop	with	a	comment	on
utilitarianism’s	supposedly	too	simple	explanation;	he	goes	on	to	detail	what	he	takes	to	be
a	specific	shortcoming	of	the	utilitarian	explanation.	It	cannot,	Williams	maintains,	properly
account	for	the	relevance	of	the	ground	projects	that	inform	an	agent’s	point	of	view.	If
Williams	was	led	to	see	the	relevance	of	the	agent’s	ground	projects	in	part	by	an
intuition	that	the	utilitarian	explanation	was	too	simple,	then	those	sympathetic	to	his
argument	should	treat	this	as	a	lucky	hunch.	But	the	luck	of	his	hunch	would	not	leave	us
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justified	in	relying	on	similar	hunches.
Our	conclusion,	then,	is	that	a	bare	appeal	to	simplicity	of	explanation	is	unlikely	to
vindicate	this	line	of	argument.
IV
A	more	promising	suggestion,	and	one	anticipated	by	the	foregoing	discussion,	is	that	a
moral	theory	can	become	suspect	for	failing	to	account	for	the	specific	considerations	that
make	some	moral	problem	a	hard	one.	A	hard	case	is	a	case	that	involves	multiple	and
conflicting	considerations	that	must	be	reconciled	or	balanced,	where	this	balancing	is
itself	difficult	to	conduct.	One	way	that	a	theory	could	end	up	treating	(what	is	thought	to
be)	a	hard	case	as	an	easy	case	is	that	it	might	not	countenance	some	of	what	are
(thought	to	be)	reasons	as	reasons	at	all.	Letting	Rf	and	Ro	each	stand	for	a	reason,
respectively,	in	favour	of	and	opposed	to	A,	here	is	such	an	argument	form:
(i)	That	A	is	right	depends	upon	how	Rf	and	Ro	are	balanced	against	one	another.
(ii)	If	T	is	true	Ro	is	no	reason	at	all.
(iii)	If	T	is	true,	then	the	fact	that	A	is	right	does	not	depend	upon	how	Rf	and	Ro
are	balanced	against	one	another.
So,
(iv)	T	is	not	true.
(p.50)	 One	immediate	and	striking	fact	about	this	reading	of	the	argument	is	that	it	is
not	at	all	clear	how	it	might	be	generalized	beyond	the	practical	realm.	For	it	is	not	clear
what	the	analogue	of	‘reasons	for	action’	would	be	in	the	context	of	an	argument	against	a
metaphysical	theory,	say.	Yet	(though	our	examples	are	all	in	the	moral	realm),	we	expect
that	arguments	‘from	obviousness’	have	been	deployed	in	non-practical	contexts.
Notice	that	on	this	argument	form,	‘balancing’	takes	place	only	once	we	have	settled
which	considerations	are	reasons.	Balancing	does	not	include	the	step	of	deciding	which
considerations	are	reasons.	This	is	why,	if	a	theory	implies	that	some	consideration	is	not
a	reason,	then	it	also	implies	that	no	balancing	of	such	a	putative	reason	can	be	called	for,
which	is	just	what	(iii)	says.
This	feature	of	the	argument	leaves	an	important	line	of	reply	available	to	the	theorist
accused	of	oversimplification.	Instead	of	accepting	(iv),	he	may	urge,	we	should	reject	(i).
We	should	think	that	some	consideration	that	we	thought	was	a	reason—and	that
therefore	we	thought	made	the	case	a	hard	one—was	in	fact	no	reason	at	all.	This	reply
may	be	bolstered	by	appeal	to	the	doctrine	of	holism,	championed	by	particularists	and
accepted	by	some	generalists.	According	to	that	doctrine,	a	consideration	can	be	a
reason	in	one	context	while	being	no	reason	at	all	in	another	context.	The	theorist	who
accepts	holism,	therefore,	need	not	deny	that	Ro	is	sometimes	a	reason;	he	need	only
deny	that	it	is	a	reason	in	this	case.	And	the	possibility	that	Ro	is	a	reason	in	some	other
cases	can	go	some	way	to	explaining	why	we	might	have	thought	it	a	reason	in	this	case.
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The	plausibility	of	this	reply,	however,	depends	upon	what	we	should	say	about	two
further	issues.	First,	the	theorist	must	allow	that	Ro	is	at	least	sometimes	a	reason.
Williams,	for	example,	seems	to	think	that	the	utilitarian	must	deny	that	facts	about	an
agent’s	ground	project	are	ever,	themselves,	reasons;	any	reasons	would	need	to	be
located	in	the	effects	for	happiness	of	acting	contrary	to	one’s	ground	projects.	Second,
the	theorist	must	sow	some	doubts	about	our	ability	to	distinguish	genuine	from
defeated	reasons.
Admittedly,	the	present	argument	is	framed	in	a	way	that	suggests	a	tight	connection
between	reasons	and	rightness,	that	the	right	action	is	the	one	favoured	by	the	balance
of	reasons.	This	connection,	of	course,	is	contested,	and	standard	normative	theories	can
be	formulated	in	ways	that	do	not	implicate	such	a	connection.	For	example,	a	standard
way	of	defining	utilitarianism	is	as	the	conjunction	of	a	consequentialist	theory	of	right
action	and	a	hedonistic	(or,	at	least,	welfarist)	theory	of	value.	One	way	of	spelling	this	out
would	be	as	follows:
Consequentialism:	An	action	is	right	if	and	only	if	it	promotes	at	least	as	much	value	as
all	the	other	actions	available	to	the	agent.
(p.51)	 Hedonism:	Pleasure	and	only	pleasure	is	good	for	its	own	sake,	pain	and	only
pain	is	bad	for	its	own	sake,	and	the	value	promoted	by	an	action	is	a	direct	function	of
the	pleasure	and	pain	that	it	promotes.
Utilitarianism:	Consequentialism	plus	Hedonism.
Crucially	these	doctrines	simply	do	not	mention	the	concept	of	a	reason	for	action.	So	on
this	way	of	defining	the	view,	there	is	at	least	no	logical	guarantee	that	the	right	act
according	to	utilitarianism	will	also	be	favoured	by	the	balance	of	reasons.	Moreover,	this
strikes	us	as	not	merely	being	logical	space	which	is	available	in	the	abstract	but
somehow	implausible	or	strained.	For	one	interesting	view	of	what	it	is	for	a	fact	F	to	be	a
reason	in	favour	of	a	given	action	A	just	is	for	F	to	explain	why	A	promotes	something	of
value.	On	this	way	of	defining	reasons	for	action,	all	sorts	of	facts	which	are	not
themselves	facts	about	pleasure	or	pain	can	count	as	reasons	for	action	in	the	right
context.	In	particular,	in	the	right	context,	the	fact	that	an	action	promotes	the	successful
pursuit	of	the	agent’s	ground	project	can	be	a	reason—so	long	as	its	promoting	that
ground	project	explains	why	the	action	promotes	pleasure	or	the	absence	of	pain.
A	utilitarian	who	takes	this	route	has	denied	(i),	and	with	some	plausibility.	But	this	move
is	best	seen	as	a	sidestep,	and	the	argument	can	be	reformulated	in	a	way	that	will
require	a	more	substantive	response.	This	is	because	the	utilitarian	we	are	here
imagining	is	still	committed	to	the	view	that	the	right	action	is	the	action	that	is	favoured
by	the	balancing	of	values.	And	this	leaves	available	a	reframing	of	the	argument	in	value,
rather	than	reason,	terms.
The	defender	of	a	normative	theory	may	still	resist	by	claiming	that	some	consideration
that	we	thought	was	a	value—and	that	therefore	we	thought	made	the	case	a	hard	one—
was	in	fact	no	value	at	all.	As	before,	this	reply	may	be	bolstered	by	an	appeal	to	holism,
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though	in	this	case	holism	about	value,	not	reasons.	According	to	holism	about	value,
something	that	bears	value	in	one	context	may	not	bear	value	in	another	context.
Our	aim,	we	emphasize,	is	not	to	defend	utilitarianism,	but	rather	to	examine	the
dialectical	force	of	appeals	to	the	morally	obvious.	So	we	will	not	examine	here	whether
this	line	of	reply	can	be	deployed	effectively	by	a	utilitarian,	even	one	willing	to	endorse
holism.	Leaving	utilitarianism	to	the	side,	then,	we	wish	to	draw	attention	to	the	more
general	issue	of	our	being	mistaken	about	reasons	(or	values).	The	basic	dialectic	is	this.
Opponents	of	T	charge	that	it	fails	to	show	that	the	rightness	of	A	is	a	‘hard	case’.	This	is
because,	critics	claim,	it	fails	to	recognize	all	of	the	genuine	and	competing	reasons	(or
values)	that	must	be	balanced	both	for	and	against	A.	Defenders	of	T	urge	that	we	not	be
too	quickly	impressed	by	this	argument	because	we	may	have	been	mistaken	about	what
is	a	reason	(or	value).
(p.52)	 One	should	doubt	such	disputes	admit	of	universal	solution.	To	adjudicate	such
disputes	one	must	have	recourse	to	the	actual	claims	that	are	being	advanced	as	reasons
(or	values).	In	principle,	we	see	no	reason	that	the	anti-theoretical	side	might	not	prevail.
So	we	accept	that	arguments	from	non-obviousness	can	sometimes	succeed.	We	do,
however,	think	such	arguments	are	typically	(and	perhaps	surprisingly)	weak.	Moreover,
the	weakness	illustrates	something	of	interest	to	debates	over	systematic	and	principled
normative	theorizing.
Over	the	past	twenty-five	years,	philosophers	who	are	at	least	sceptical	of	general
normative	theorizing	have	been	among	those	who	are	most	insistent	that	philosophers
need	to	appreciate	more	carefully	the	subtlety	and	variability	of	the	moral	terrain.	They
have	done	this	by	highlighting	the	diverse	ways	in	which	facts	can	be	morally	relevant	and
the	contingencies	that	affect	how	facts	vary	in	relevance	across	cases.	The	development
of	holism—about	both	reasons	and	values—is	but	one	instance	of	this	trend.	Bernard
Williams’s	own	rich	discussions	of	the	historical	and	cultural	contingencies	that	affect
moral	thinking	are	another.	There	are	two	ways	of	making	this	last	point,	one	of	which
presupposes	holism	and	one	of	which	does	not.	The	first	one,	which	we	have	already
discussed	at	length,	explicitly	invokes	holistic	assumptions	about	reasons	to	distinguish
different	forms	of	normative	relevance.	Even	a	diehard	atomist,	though,	can	distinguish
reasons	for	action	from	(a)	things	a	virtuous/wise	agent	ought	to	heed	in	deliberation,	and
(b)	evidence	that	an	action	is	right	or	wrong.	Insofar	as	arguments	of	this	form	can
thereby	be	accused	of	having	confused	different	forms	of	normative	relevance,	or
perhaps	of	begging	the	question	by	assuming	that	the	relevant	feature	just	is	a	reason
for	action	and	not	relevant	in	some	other	way,	the	defender	of	the	theory	in	question	is
left	room	to	manoeuvre.
At	the	risk	of	painting	with	too	broad	a	brush,	it	nevertheless	seems	fair	to	say	that
emphasis	on	the	subtlety	and	variability	of	the	moral	terrain	is	often	thought	to	support
anti-theoretical	predilections.	If	the	moral	terrain	is	especially	rich	and	nuanced,	then
capturing	it	in	any	general	normative	theory	must	be	more	difficult,	if	it	is	possible	at	all.
Whatever	the	merits	of	this	line	of	argument,	in	the	case	of	arguments	from	non-
obviousness	the	dialectical	advantage	runs	in	the	other	direction.	The	more	subtle	and
Obvious Objections
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variable	the	moral	landscape	can	be,	the	less	sure	we	are	entitled	to	be	that	we	know
which	cases	truly	are	the	‘hard	ones’.	If	we	cannot	be	highly	confident	which	cases	are
‘hard	ones’	then	we	cannot	have	strong	reason	to	reject	a	theory	on	the	basis	that	it
miscategorizes	a	hard	case.	Two	reminders	are	in	order.	First,	‘hard	cases’	are	not	here
characterized	in	epistemic	terms,	and	for	reasons	we	have	already	given,	arguments
from	non-obviousness	must	not	rely	on	such	a	characterization.	Secondly,	we	have	not
tried	to	argue	that	arguments	from	non-obviousness	cannot	succeed,	only	that	(p.53)
they	are	characteristically	weak.	The	reason	for	this	can	be	put	simply:	The	less	obvious
morality	is,	the	less	obvious	it	should	be	what	is	morally	obvious.
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